University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and
Class
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 3

Assisted Reproduction: Reforming State Statutes After Obergefell
v. Hodges and Pavan v. Smith
Thomas B. James

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Medical
Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas B. James, Assisted Reproduction: Reforming State Statutes After Obergefell v. Hodges and
Pavan v. Smith, 19 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender & Class 261 ().
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol19/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class
by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

JAMES

ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: REFORMING STATE
STATUTES AFTER OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND PAVAN
V. SMITH
BY THOMAS B. JAMES*
Assisted reproduction provides a way for people to become parents other than through sexual intercourse. Some heterosexual couples
turn to it when they are having difficulty conceiving children. For samesex couples, it is the only way to conceive children. Many states have
enacted statutes conferring parental status on couples who use assisted
reproduction technology and shielding gamete donors from parental responsibilities. Statutes addressing only artificial insemination and not
in-vitro fertilization leave the parental rights of couples who use donor
eggs, and the parental responsibilities of egg donors, uncertain. The constitutionality of statutes authorizing only opposite-sex married couples
to establish parental rights, limiting assisted reproduction to artificial
insemination, and protecting only sperm donors from parental responsibilities is dubious at best. The Article describes the changes needed to
bring these statutes current with modern science and into compliance
with constitutional requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 5 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA 1973) provides:
Artificial Insemination
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and
with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband’s
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his
wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the
date of the insemination, and file the husband’s consent
with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be
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kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician’s failure to do so does not affect the father and
child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to
the insemination, whether part of the permanent record
of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician
or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician
for use in artificial insemination of a married woman
other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.1
This or a statute like it has been enacted and is still in effect in
fifteen states.2 In some states, it has remained unchanged for nearly forty
years.3
In the decades that have passed since this law was enacted, many
significant scientific, social, and legal changes have taken place.4 Dramatic advancements have been made in assisted reproduction technology (ART).5 Sexual intercourse and artificial insemination are not the
only methods of conceiving children anymore.6 In addition, the acceptance of parentage outside of marriage has increased significantly,7

1

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501(B) (2007); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (Supp. 2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2009); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(1) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6106(1) (2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1
(2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West Supp. 2016).
3
Compare Parentage Act, Minn. Laws ch. 589 § 6 (1980) with MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West
2015).
4
See discussion infra Part II.
5
Assisted reproduction means conception other than by sexual intercourse. MODEL ACT
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008). Collaborative reproduction is “assisted
reproduction in which an individual other than an intended parent(s) provides genetic material
or agrees to act as a gestational carrier.” Id. at §102(5). Assisted reproduction technology (ART)
is any method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse. Id. at §102(2).
6
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
7
See Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through
the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2007)
(“[I]llegitimacy-based discrimination against children of [opposite-sex] couples has largely
faded from the legal (and social) landscape . . . .”); cf. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not
Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the TwentyFirst Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 211–12 (2009) (noting that the “legal doctrine of
‘illegitimacy’ had all but disappeared”).
2
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as has the number of children born to single women.8 Among some populations, more children are conceived by unmarried women than by
married women.9 Finally, and most recently, the United States Supreme
Court has held that states must grant same-sex couples the same marital
rights that opposite-sex couples have.10
Assisted reproduction statutes have not kept pace with these
changes.11 In most states, they still protect only married persons.12 Gendered language appears throughout them.13 Thirteen states address artificial insemination but not egg donation.14 Twelve states have no assisted reproduction statute at all.15 “Throughout the United States, little

8

In 1973, roughly 13% of births were to unmarried women. Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States 1940-99, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP.,
OCT.
18,
2000,
at
1,
available
at
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf. In 2017, 39.8% of births in the
United States were to unmarried women. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2017,
NAT’L
VITAL
STAT.
REP.,
Nov.
7,
2018,
at
5,
available
at
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr67/nvsr67_08-508.pdf.
9
Hispanic black women and 52.1% of Hispanic women who give birth are unmarried. Martin, supra note 8, at 5–6.
10
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
11
See infra text accompanying notes 10–15.
12
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501(b) (2018); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2017); COLO REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-774
(2018); FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403
(2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2018); MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 46, § 4B (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2018);
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824(1) (2017); MONT. CODE § 40-6-106(1) (2017); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 73 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90,
3111.95 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551 to 556 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (2018); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-156, 20-158 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1) (2018). New Jersey makes its statute applicable to partners in civil unions as well as spouses. N.J. STAT. § 9:17–44 (2019).
13
See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018) (containing 20 male-gendered nouns and
pronouns).
14
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501(b) (2018); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 (2018);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (2016); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 46, § 4B (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56
(2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824(1) (2017); MONT. CODE § 40-6-106(1) (2017); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(1)
(2018). Sometimes a court can rescue a statute by imposing a gender-neutral construction on
gendered language. See, e.g., Torres v. Seemeyer, 207 F. Supp. 3d 905, 914 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(requiring “husband” to be construed to mean a spouse of either sex). It is doubtful that this
approach could save statutes that use terms with necessarily gender-restricted meanings such as
“semen.” See id.
15
The states are Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia.
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legislative or judicial attention has been paid to anticipating and resolving potential legal ramifications of physician-assisted reproduction.”16
This is not a trivial matter. Over a million people have turned to ART to
conceive children.17 It is the only way for monogamous same-sex couples to procreate.18
This article provides a framework for understanding and repairing assisted reproduction laws. Part II explains the historical development of parentage law, of which assisted reproduction law is part.19 Part
III describes the objectives of these laws and the stakeholder interests
they serve.20 Part IV identifies specific areas in which assisted reproduction statutes are deficient and suggests approaches for correcting them.21
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Under English common law, parentage was linked to marital status.22 The husband of a married woman who conceived or gave birth to
a child during the marriage was deemed the child’s father, but children
born to an unmarried woman were deemed to have no father; they were
nullius filius (“kin of nobody.”)23 This principle carried over to the
United States.24 The father of a child conceived out of wedlock was not

16
Kerry S. Cork, Comment, Test Tube Parents: Collaborative Reproduction in Minnesota,
22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1996); see also Jean M. Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare” Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 709 (1991); Anne R. Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 267 (1995).
17
By 2015, more than 850,00 married women between the ages of 15 and 44 had used artificial insemination. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—
United States, 2015, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1
(Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Feb. 16, 2018). In vitro fertilization and related
procedures are performed on married women between the ages of 15 and 44 at a rate of 182,111
per year. Id.
18
John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 323, 325 n.9 (2004).
19
See discussion infra Part II.
20
See discussion infra Part III.
21
See discussion infra Part IV.
22
Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1658
(2015).
23
ERNST FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES 9 (1919).
24
Id.; Suzanne E. Miller, Family Law—Support—The Natural Father of a Child Born Out of
Wedlock May Not Assert as a Defense Against His Support Obligation the Mother’s Deliberate
Misrepresentation That She was Using Contraception, 29 VILL. L. REV. 185, 189 n.19 (1984).
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legally recognized as a parent unless he “legitimated” the child by marrying the mother..25 French civil law, adopted in Louisiana, also linked
parentage to marital status.26
The first parentage statutes were enacted for the purpose of shifting responsibility for the support of children born out of wedlock from
the state to a child’s biological parents.27 They were also an exercise of
a state’s police power to regulate morals, the object being to deter the
crime of fornication.28 The result, in most states, was a legal system that
treated unwed biological fathers as parents for purposes of the support
obligation but as nonparents for inheritance, custody, and other purposes.29
By the middle of the twentieth century, many states had enacted
laws codifying the principle that only the mother of a child born out of
25
FREUND, supra note 23, at 12; see also Wright v. Bennett, 7 Ill. 587, 591 (1845) (holding
that a father of a child born out of wedlock is not a parent); Friesner v. Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259
(N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1890) (denying a father custody of a nonmarital child upon the mother’s death
because only mothers are parents of children born out of wedlock); Bustamento v. Analla, 1
N.M. 255, 261–62 (1857) (granting a writ of habeas corpus to a mother for the release of her
nonmarital child from the child’s father); Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 115, 135, 137 (1867) (holding that only a mother, not the father, could authorize the apprenticeship of a child born out of
wedlock).
26
JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 323, 328–29,
418–20 (Boston: Little Brown & Co. 4th ed., 1889).
27
Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1034–35 (2007);
Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in
Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1124 (1999).
28
See, e.g., Bake v. State, 21 Md. 422, 424 (1864); Dominik Lasok, Virginia Bastardy
Laws: A Burdensome Heritage, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 402, 412 (1967) (“…[T]he parish could
improve its funds by collecting the fine for fornication from the putative father and purge the
public scandal by having him whipped”); W. Logan MacCoy, Law of Pennsylvania Relating to
Illegitimacy, 7 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 505, 512 (1916–1917).
29
“[T]he duty of parents to their bastard children, by our law . . . is principally that of maintenance. For, though bastards are not looked upon as children to any civil purposes, yet the ties of
nature, of which maintenance is one, are not so easily dissolved.” 1 BLACKSTONE *458. “[A
child born out of wedlock] can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody…. All
other children have their primary settlement in their father’s parish; but a bastard in the parish
where born, for he hath no father.” 1 BLACKSTONE *459. See also SCHOULER, supra note 26, at
418. Under early English common law, children born out of wedlock were said to be filius populi, children of the state, in the sense that the community was responsible for their support.
Lawrence Gabriele, Domestic Relations—Right of Putative Father to Visit His Illegitimate
Child, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 192, 192 n.2 (1965). The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576 empowered
courts to impose a support obligation on fathers of children born out of wedlock, while customary law continued to assign responsibility for the daily care of a child primarily to the mother
(and then to the state, if she was not able to do so). Act for the Setting of the Poor on Work and
for the Avoiding of Idleness, 1576, 18 Eliz. ch. 3 (Eng.); Act for the Relief of the Poor,
1601, 43 Eliz. ch. 2 (Eng.); Miller, supra note 24, at 189 n.16. Constitutions and statutes in most
American states adopted this framework. FREUND, supra note 23, at 9; Miller, supra note 24, at
189 n.19.
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wedlock is a parent.30 The consensus at the time was that “the overwhelming percentage of fathers of out-of-wedlock children are not interested in their children, in recognizing them, in supporting them, in
legitimating them, or especially in seeking their custody.”31 Since the
United States Supreme Court had declared parental rights to be liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,32 a parent would have
a right, under the Due Process Clause, to notice and an opportunity for
a hearing before parental rights could be terminated.33 Excluding unwed
biological fathers from the definition of parent ensured that mothers
could place children born out of wedlock in the care of third parties
(through adoption or a transfer of custody) expeditiously and without
resistance.34 State supreme courts generally upheld the constitutionality
of these enactments.35 The United States Supreme Court put an end to
that in 1972, however.36 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that both
parents of a child have constitutionally protected parental rights and that
statutory schemes that unreasonably discriminate against parents on the
basis of marital status are unconstitutional.37

30
See, e.g., 1951 FLA. LAWS 187 (codified with different language at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(56)
(2019)) (“‘Parent’ means the father or mother of a child or the natural mother but not the natural
father of an illegitimate child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1964) (codified with different language at O.C.G.A. § 19-7-25 (1982)) (“The mother of an illegitimate child . . . [b]eing the only
recognized parent, . . . may exercise all the paternal power”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-35
(1960) (repealed 1975); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 25-8-46 (1967) (repealed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36236 (1970) (repealed); WIS. STAT. § 48.02 (1967) (amended 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-53
(1967) (repealed). The Illinois statute simply omitted unwed fathers from the definition of “parent,” stating that “[p]arents” means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor
of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent.” ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701–14 (1967) (current version at 705 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1–3
(West 2015)).
31
In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1965).
32
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401–02 (1923).
33
Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (invalidating a statute that presumed
all unwed fathers unfit to parent without providing an opportunity for a hearing); Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (observing that the fundamental right
of an opportunity for a hearing “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter
is pending”).
34
See, e.g., Day v. Hatton, 83 S.E.2d 6, 7 (Ga. 1954) (holding that a state statute declaring
that only the mother of a child born of wedlock has parental rights requires an award of custody
to a third party to whom the mother had transferred custody rather than to the child’s father).
35
See, e.g., State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 178 N.W.2d 56, 62–63 (Wis. 1970),
vacated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
36
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645, 658.
37
Id.
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A. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 1973
The decision in Stanley v. Illinois impelled the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws38 (NCCUSL) to formulate a uniform state law on paternity that would pass constitutional muster.39 The UPA 1973 was the product of this endeavor.40 A core purpose
was to ensure that “all children and all parents have equal rights with
respect to each other,” regardless of the marital status of parents.41 While
they were at it, the commissioners decided to address a novel legal question that had recently been raised, namely, whether couples that use artificial insemination to conceive children are parents.42
At the time the first sperm bank opened in 1970, “legal
parenthood was largely coterminous with biological parenthood.”43 The
only exception was adoption.44 The commissioners elected “not [to] deal
with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of
artificial insemination”45 but reached a consensus about one thing: Rather than require a husband to adopt children whom his wife conceives
using donated sperm, children born to married couples using physiciansupervised artificial insemination with the husband’s consent should be
treated no differently from children who are conceived through sexual
intercourse.46

38

The NCCUSL is now known as the Uniform Laws Commission (ULC). About Us,
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last visited Mar.
3, 2020).
39
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (amended 2002).
40
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
41
Id. § 2 cmt.
42
Id. § 5.
43
William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS. 263, 263
(2010). The presumption of legitimacy during marriage originated in the idea that a husband is
likely to be the biological father of children his wife conceives during the marriage. Id. It may
also reflect a social judgment that the husband ought to be the biological parent. Id. The enactment of statutes making the presumption conclusive (irrebuttable) tends to support the latter
view. Whether rebuttable or conclusive, though, the presumption of legitimacy is that a husband
is the biological parent of any children born during the marriage. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 257.55, subd. 1 (2018) (stating the presumption). The conclusiveness of the presumption
simply regulates the extent to which the existence of a biological relationship may be challenged.
44
“Even adoption…has traditionally been organized by law in such a way as to create adoptive families that imitate biological parent families.” Duncan, supra note 43, at 263.
45
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, cmt (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
46
Id. § 5(a) (declaring that the husband “is treated in law as if he were the natural father” in
this circumstance).
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B. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 2002
Two important developments occurred after the UPA 1973 was
written. First, advancements in science and technology made it possible
for women to donate their eggs to other women.47 Second, Congress enacted laws requiring states that wished to receive federal funds to “provide simplified nonjudicial means to establish paternity, especially for
newborns and young children.”48 Cognizant of these developments, the
NCCUSL decided to promulgate a revision of the UPA, which it did in
the year 200049 (UPA 2000).
Reception to the revisions was lukewarm.50 The American Bar
Association objected that the Act still only recognized the right of married couples to be parents of children of assisted reproduction.51 The organization took the position that unless the Act gave unmarried and married couples the same right to be parents of children of assisted
reproduction, it was unconstitutional.52 In Minnesota, the legislature established a Uniform Parentage Act Task Force (Task Force) to study the
proposed revisions and make recommendations about whether they
should be adopted.53 The Task Force recommended against adopting
them.54 Among other things, the Task Force shared the American Bar
Association’s objection that the Act still limited assisted reproduction to
married couples.55 The NCCUSL agreed that the objection had merit so
in 2002 it released a second revision (UPA 2002), this one treating married and unmarried couples alike in the context of assisted reproduction.56 The Task Force had already made its recommendation by then,
however.57 As a result, the Minnesota legislature never considered the
UPA 2002.58
47
The first successful pregnancy using donated eggs occurred in 1983. Bonnie Steinbock,
Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71 MT. SINAI J. MED. 255, 257 (2004).
48
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). See 42
U.S.C. § 666 (2019).
49
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
50
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAWS COMM’N 2002).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
2001 Minn. Laws 645.
54
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 3 (2002) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT].
55
Id. at 26.
56
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, cmt., 703, cmt., 704, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
57
The Task Force issued its report in January, 2002. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at
1. The UPA 2002 was released in December, 2002. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2002).
58
See 2002 Minn. Laws 1838-1839.
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Although the Task Force did not recommend adopting the UPA
2000, it acknowledged “a significant need for comprehensive, specific
legislation concerning the various aspects of parentage (or disputed parentage) and related matters when individuals use assisted reproduction.”59 That need still exists.60
C. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT OF 2017
Obergefell v. Hodges61 was a modern-day Stanley v. Illinois, except that this time the victory was for same-sex couples, not unwed fathers.62 Issued in 2015, it established that the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states from limiting the right of marriage to opposite-sex couples.63 Two years later,
Pavan v. Smith64 clarified that Obergefell meant that states may not discriminate against same-sex couples.65 States must give spouses in samesex marriages the same benefits and protections they give spouses in
opposite sex marriages.66 If a state law provides for putting the husband’s name on the birth certificate of a child born during a marriage,
then the names of both spouses in a same-sex marriage must be put on
the birth certificates of children born to them during their marriage,
too.67 If Mr. and Mrs. John and Mary Jones conceive a child through
assisted reproduction while they are married, and the law presumes John
and Mary to be the child’s parents, then the law must also presume that
a child conceived by Mary using assisted reproduction while she is married to Joan is the child of Mary and Joan.68
To adapt the UPA to the newly established constitutional mandate to treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike the NCCUSL, in
2017, promulgated another revision (UPA 2017).69 At the same time,
the commissioners took the opportunity to address the right of children
59

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 24.
Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L.
REV. 325, 325–26 (2019).
61
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
62
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); see also Obergefell, 138 S. Ct. 2584 at 2608.
63
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
64
137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
65
Id. at 2078.
66
Id. at 2078–79.
67
Id.
68
McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied,
sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.Ct. 1165 (2018); see also Wendy G-M v. Erin GM, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding that the marital presumption of legitimacy applies to children born to same-sex couples, too).
69
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
60

JAMES

270

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 19:2

of assisted reproduction to access information about their gamete donors, and to provide for the elimination of the parental rights of men
who impregnate women by sexual assault.70 So far, only California, Vermont, and Washington have adopted this version of the Act.71
III. STATUTORY OBJECTIVES
Parentage law is concerned with the rights, responsibilities, and
methods of establishing the identity of a child’s parents.72 It attempts to
balance the interests of children, parents, and the state in a manner that
complies with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.73 Assisted reproduction implicates an additional category of interests: gamete donors.74
A. STATES’ FINANCIAL INTEREST
The principal reason for the enactment of parentage laws is to
lighten a state’s welfare burden by compelling men to financially support the children they father out of wedlock.75 When a child’s biological
parents are financially dependent on the state for financial assistance,
adoptions serve the state’s financial interests by transferring responsibility for children to couples who are able and willing to care for them.76
Hence, states also have a financial interest in facilitating adoptions.77
After Stanley, facilitating adoptions can no longer be considered a valid
justification for completely obliterating parental rights, but it is still used
as a justification for establishing short time frames and strictly enforcing
70

Id. § 614, art. 9.
Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited Feb. 28,
2019).
72
Establishing Parentage, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://www.crckids.org/child-support/establishing-paternity/. (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
73
Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents: More
Principled Allocations of Powers and Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479, 479480 (2017).
74
Maya Sabatello, Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal and Social Implications, CTR. FOR RES. ON ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOC. IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHIATRIC,
NEUROLOGIC & BEHAV. GENETICS 352, 352-353 (2015).
75
Hatcher, supra note 27, at 1038; Lasok, supra note 28, at 407; Hansen, supra note 27, at
1144; Current Legislation, The Uniform Illegitimacy Act and the Present Status of Illegitimate
Children, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 909–10 (1924).
76
Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2007).
77
See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic Entitlement,
91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 491 (2017).
71
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procedural requirements for putative fathers to assert paternity.78 Prompt
determinations of parentage for the purpose of establishing child support orders continues to be a principal objective of parentage laws, as
well.79
The federal government provides grants to states to help them
establish and collect child support.80 Congress has conditioned these
grants on a state’s enactment of the kinds of parentage and child support
laws the federal government specifies.81 As a result, states have a financial interest in complying with federally imposed paternity establishment requirements.82
B. CHILDREN’S INTERESTS
Identifying a child’s parents makes it possible to establish and
enforce support obligations for a child’s benefit.83 Since parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest,84 establishing and enforcing
parental rights normally furthers that interest.85 Knowing who their parents are also may benefit children psychologically, helping them acquire
a sense of identity.86 Knowing their medical and genetic histories can
improve children’s likelihood of receiving appropriate medical care.87
Finally, parentage determinations help ensure that children receive the
inheritances to which they are entitled.88

78

Id. at 493. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983) (“The legitimate state
interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously . . . justify a . . . determination to require all interested parties to adhere
precisely to the procedural requirements . . . . “).
79
Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67, 70, 74–75 (2014).
80
42 U.S.C. § 651 (2019).
81
42 U.S.C. § 654 (2019).
82
See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000).
83
See How to Get Child Support, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/how-to-get-child-support.
84
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
85
See June Carbone, Legal Applications of the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial
Rationalization or a measure of Institutional Competence?, 134 OFFICIAL J. OF THE AM.
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS SUPP. 2 S111, S112 (2019).
86
J. David Velleman, Family History, 34 PHIL. PAPERS 357, 369 (2005).
87
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
88
Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770–71 (1977) (invalidating intestate succession laws
that allow only children of married parents to inherit from their fathers).
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C. PARENTS’ INTERESTS
In an earlier age, children were considered a valuable labor resource for parents.89 Today, the law emphasizes the interest of parents
in the companionship and care of their children, and in raising them as
they see fit.90 Parents also have an interest in being treated fairly.91 In
1923, the U.S. Supreme Court held that parental rights are protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 A long line of cases since then has affirmed that parental rights
are not merely protected; they are fundamental rights.93 This means that
a parent may be divested of them only if doing so is necessary to serve
a compelling government interest.94 In addition, parents and children, as
citizens, have a constitutionally protected interest in receiving the equal
protection of a state’s laws.95 A primary reason the NCCUSL convened
to promulgate a uniform parentage act in 1973 was to comply with Supreme Court rulings that state laws may not discriminate against children born out of wedlock.96 Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, states must now attempt to provide equal
protection of the laws along three different axes: sex, marital status, and
sexual orientation.97 Individuals have an interest in making their own

89
1 BLACKSTONE *452; MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994); see, e.g., McEntyre
v. Jones, 263 P.2d 313, 314 (Colo. 1953) (approving a jury instruction regarding the probable
pecuniary benefit a child could provide for a parent, as an element of damages in a claim for the
wrongful death of the child); Evans v. Farmers Elevator Co., 147 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Mo. 1941)
(explaining that a child may assert a claim for loss of future earning capacity as an adult but the
claim for lost earning capacity as a child belongs to the child’s parents). This interest continues
to play a role in wrongful death cases where a parent makes a claim for money damages for the
loss of a deceased child’s “services” in providing a parent companionship, society, and affection. John C. Duncan Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1270 (2005).
90
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (companionship and care); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972)
(right to direct educational and religious upbringing).
91
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
92
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
93
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602–606 (1979); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925).
94
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
95
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
97
See discussion infra, Section IV.A, B, C and D.
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decisions about procreation, that is, decisions about whether and when
they will become parents.98
D. GAMETE DONORS ’INTERESTS
Donors have an interest in avoiding the legal consequences that
traditionally flow from a biological relationship with a child.99 Few people would be willing to donate their gametes to others if it meant incurring a risk of liability for child support.100 For this and other reasons,
donors also have interests in confidentiality and anonymity.101
E. TRIBAL INTERESTS
Because tribes have a federally protected interest in the custody
and placement of children who are members of the tribe or the biological
children of tribe members, parentage laws should address whether and
how they apply to these children.102
The remainder of this article explores the specific changes that
need to be made to state assisted reproduction laws to better accomplish
the legitimate objectives of assisted reproduction laws, to comply with
constitutional requirements, and to bring them up to date with modern
technology.103

98
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing “the right of the individual. . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child”) (emphasis added).
99
Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 93, 190.
100
Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007) (“[W]here a would-be donor
cannot trust that he is safe from a future support action, he will be considerably less likely to
provide his sperm. . .”).
101
See generally Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor
Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291 (2013).
102
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 17.
103
See discussion infra, Part IV.
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IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. EGGS, EMBRYOS, AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Artificial insemination is the oldest known form of assisted reproduction, dating back to the eighteenth century.104 It involves inserting sperm into a woman’s uterus, fallopian tubes, or vagina with a needle.105 Sperm may be fresh or cryopreserved; it may be used
immediately or stored for later use.106 If the sperm comes from the
woman’s husband, the procedure is called homologous insemination.107
Heterologous insemination, or artificial insemination by donor (AID),
involves a third-party donor.108 Egg donation is a newer phenomenon.109
It involves extracting eggs, fertilizing them with sperm, and inserting
the resulting embryo into the uterus of the recipient.110 This procedure
is called in-vitro fertilization and embryo transfer.111 Like sperm, embryos can be cryopreserved, so they may be transferred shortly after
forming or preserved for possible future use.112 With the advent of invitro fertilization and embryo transfer technology, gamete donation is
no longer the exclusive province of males.113
Assisted reproduction using third-party gamete donors squarely
raises the question whether it is biological relatedness or intent that establishes parentage.114 If biological relatedness is determinative, then a
104

Willem Ombelet & Johan Van Robays, Artificial Insemination—History: Hurdles and
Milestones, 7 FACTS, VIEWS & VISIONS IN OBGYN 137, 138 (2015).
105
Julie E. Goodwin, Comment, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 208, 212 (2005).
106
Kate W. Lyon, Babies on Ice: The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos Involved in Custody
Disputes During Divorce, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 695, 698 (2000). Cryopreservation is a process
by which human cells are frozen, remaining viable for long periods of time. Id. at 699.
107
Priyasha Saksena, Artificial Insemination and the Family, 20 NAT’L LAW SCH. OF INDIA
REV. 76, 78 (2008).
108
Id.
109
John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg
Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988–1989).
110
Michelle L. Anderson, Comment, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of Embryo
Donation, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 589, 599–600 (2006).
111
The UPA 2017 defines “assisted reproduction” to include (a) intrauterine or intracervical
insemination, (b) donation of gametes, (c) donation of embryos, (d) in-vitro fertilization and
transfer of embryos, and (e) intracytoplasmic sperm injection. There is some overlap in these
categories. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
112
Lyon, supra note 106, at 698–99.
113
See Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 25 (2010).
114
Lyon , supra note 106, at 726.
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gamete donor will be a child’s legal parent even if everybody involved
intended the recipient and the recipient’s spouse or significant other, if
any, to be the child’s parent(s).115 If intent is determinative, then a gamete donor will not be a parent unless that is what the parties intended.116
In the absence of legislative guidance, courts have developed and applied contradictory rules of decision.117 Sometimes they will ascribe no
significance to genetics and focus instead on effectuating the parties ’
intent, an approach that can result in a determination that a donor is not
a parent but can also result in a determination that a donor is a parent.118
At other times, they will ignore the parties ’intent and rely instead on
genetic relatedness.119 Obviously, this has created a great deal of uncertainty in the law.120 Some guidance from legislatures would be helpful.
Legislation clarifying that assisted reproduction statutes apply to
both sperm donors and egg donors is also needed. Thirteen states have
statutes that reference sperm donors, artificial insemination, or both, but
not egg donors or in-vitro fertilization.121 It is remarkable that the legislatures of these states have never amended their statutes to provide female gamete donors the same legal protections as male gamete donors,
given that more than one commentator has observed that these statutes
violate women’s Equal Protection rights.122
It might be thought that it is not necessary to explicitly state that
egg donors are not parents because only a person who carries a baby in
115

Alisa Von Hagel, Federalism and Bioethics: Women’s Health and the Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 79 (2014).
116
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d I74, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that the law honors the parties
clearly manifested intentions to donate their pre-zygotes for research purposes).
117
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 841 (2000).
118
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (applying intent analysis to
hold that an egg donor, not the birth mother, is a child’s parent); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940
A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (applying intent analysis to hold that a sperm donor is not a child’s
parent).
119
See, e.g., Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a
waiver of a biological parent’s child support obligation is against public policy and unenforceable regardless of the parties’ intent).
120
Marsha Garrison, Law Making For Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 845, 838 (2000).
121
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-501 (2007); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401–
408 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §23-2301 (Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. L. Part I, title 7, ch. 46, §4B
(2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. §210.824 (West 2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (MCKINNEY 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 49A-1 (2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 2016).
122
See Mary Lynne Birck, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technology and Motherhood:
The Search for Common Ground and the Recognition of Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1623,
1653 (1994); Cork, supra note 16, at 1561.
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her womb can be a mother. State laws are far from certain on this point,
however.123 For example, a Minnesota statute authorizes a legal action
to declare the existence of a mother-child relationship and makes Minnesota Statutes §§ 257.51 to 257.74 applicable to it.124 These statutes, in
turn, authorize a mother-child relationship to be established either “by
proof of her having given birth to the child, or under sections 257.51 to
257.74 or 257.75.”125 Among other things, these sections provide that a
biological relationship between a person and a child, as determined by
genetic testing, can be used as the basis for a finding that the person is
the child’s parent.126 An egg donor has a biological relationship with a
child that is conceived using her eggs.127 Therefore, these statutes could
reasonably be interpreted to mean that either or both the birth mother
and the egg donor (biological mother) could be parents of a child conceived with a donated egg.128
Of course, the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an absolute prohibition against legislative classifications that treat people differently.129 The classification must at least be rational, though, i.e., it
must treat people “who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law” the same.130 The purpose of assisted reproduction statutes,
insofar as they concern donors, is to protect people who donate their
gametes to others from being declared the parents of children conceived
with them.131 Men and women may not be similarly situated with respect
to the ability to become pregnant, but they are similarly situated with
respect to the capacity to donate gametes to others.132 They were not

123

See infra text accompanying notes 124–28.
MINN. STAT. § 257.71 (2018).
125
MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
126
MINN. STAT. § 257.62 (2018).
127
Susan Golombok et al., Children conceived by gamete donation: Psychological adjustment
and mother-child relationships at age 7, 25 J. FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY, 230 (2011).
128
Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.71 (2018) with; MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2018); and MINN.
STAT. § 257.62 (2018).
129
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
130
Jospeh Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 346 (1949).
131
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
132
Christina M. Eastman, Comment, Statutory Regulation of Legal Parentage in Cases of
Artificial Insemination by Donor: A New Frontier of Gender Discrimination, 41 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 371, 391–92 (2010). Gamete donors use their gametes to enable others to become pregnant, not to become pregnant themselves. Id. See also Lord v. Lord, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding men and women are also similarly situated with respect to the
child support obligation).
124
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similarly situated in this respect at the time the UPA 1973 was promulgated, but they are now.133
Statutes that discriminate against similarly situated individuals
on the basis of sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unless they are substantially related to achieving an important government interest.134 An “exceedingly persuasive justification” is needed to sustain them.135 Statutes are scrutinized even more
closely if they discriminate with respect to a fundamental right.136 When
that is the case, a state must demonstrate that the classification is necessary and narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest.137
The right of personal autonomy with regard to the decision not to become a parent is a fundamental right.138 No important or compelling
nondiscriminatory interest is served by protecting male gamete donors
but not female gamete donors from child support obligations, or by authorizing couples to become legal parents using donated sperm but not
donated eggs.139
B. SAME-SEX COUPLES
The UPA 1973 and state statutes adopting it were written long
before Obergefell and Pavan v. Smith held that states must treat samesex and opposite-sex couples alike. Today, if a state extends a right of
marriage to opposite-sex couples, then it must extend the right of marriage to same-sex couples, too.140 If a state extends a benefit of marriage
to opposite-sex couples, then it must extend the same benefit to samesex couples, too.141 This includes the benefit of a presumption that the
133

See Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 25 (2010) (stating that the first IVF birth occurred in
1983).
134
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
135
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
136
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
137
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U. S.
621, 627 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
138
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154;
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 57–58 (1994); see also Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (invoking the constitutionally protected right to decide not
to become a parent to uphold an individual’s right to object to the implantation of embryos to
which s/he has contributed gametes).
139
See Eastman, supra note 132, at 396–405, for a detailed analysis concluding that assisted
reproduction statutes limited to artificial insemination violate the Equal Protection Clause.
140
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
141
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017).
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spouse of a woman who gives birth to a child during the marriage is a
parent of the child.142 If a state declares that the male spouse of a woman
who conceives or gives birth to a child of assisted reproduction during
the marriage is a parent of the child, then it must also declare that the
female spouse of a woman who conceives or gives birth to a child of
assisted reproduction during the marriage is a parent of the child.143 To
comply with constitutional requirements, therefore, assisted reproduction statutes should be made gender-neutral so they apply to both samesex and opposite-sex couples.144 Gendered pronouns should be replaced
with gender-neutral ones.145 The words husband and wife should be replaced with spouse.146 The words mother and father should be replaced
with parent.147
C. UNMARRIED COUPLES
Most states that adopted the UPA 1973 opted to make the ART
provision applicable to both married and unmarried couples.148 When
the NCCUSL issued its first revision of the UPA in 2000, the American
Bar Association objected to provisions that did not treat children of married and unmarried parents the same.149 The Task Force voiced this objection, as well.150 The NCCUSL agreed the objection had merit and
therefore removed references to “husbands” and “wives” from the
Act.151 Despite this, a majority of state statutes still only recognize the
right of married couples to conceive children using third-party donors.152
142
McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017), cert. denied,
sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.Ct. 1165 (2018) (“The marital paternity presumption is a benefit of marriage, and following Pavan and Obergefell, the state cannot deny samesex spouses the same benefits afforded opposite-sex spouses”).
143
Pavan, 137 S.Ct. at 2077–79.
144
See id.
145
Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L. J. 2260, 2342 (2017). See generally Colorado General Assembly Office of Legis. Legal Services, COLORADO LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING MANUAL 1, 133-136 (2017).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the
Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 536 n.40 (1994).
149
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
150
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, executive summary.
151
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
152
ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-501 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2018);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21
(2015); IDAHO CODE § 39-5403 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 (Supp. 2014); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. Art. 188 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
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This is not a significant problem for the female member of an
unmarried couple that uses artificial insemination to conceive.153 Since
the birth mother’s own egg is used in this situation, she will be both the
biological mother and the birth mother.154 She may use either of these
as a basis for claiming to be a parent.155 It is a significant problem for
the other member of an unmarried couple, though.156 Not having a biological relationship with the child and not having the benefit of a presumption of legitimacy during marriage, s/he will not be considered the
child’s parent even if the couple complies with all the requirements set
out in the state’s statute.157 In some states, it might be possible to invoke
a statutory presumption of parentage if the person lives with the child
and holds the child out as his or her own.158 Even if it is available in a
particular jurisdiction, however, not everybody will be able to invoke
this presumption.159 An unmarried person must either endure the delay
and expense of adoption or wait a while and hope the mother does not
decide to move away with the child.160 Even then, it will still be necessary to file a petition in court and ask a judge to declare his or her parentage.161 Assisted reproduction statutes, by contrast, declare a married
person a parent immediately upon the birth of the child.162 A spouse is
not required to petition for adoption or to commence a proceeding in
court to establish parentage, much less wait a couple of years to do so.163
333.2824(6) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010);
MONT. CODE ANN § 40-6-106 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (2019) (“Spouse Or Partner In
A Civil Union”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2015);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.90–95 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-556 (2018); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 109.243, 677.365 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78b-15-703 (West 2018); VA. CODE §§ 20-156-158 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (West Supp.
2016).
153
Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman’s Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for
an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5(1981).
154
Id. at 38.
155
Id. at 18-19.
156
Id. at 4.
157
Custody of a Child Conceived by Artificial insemination, HG, https://www.hg.org/legalarticles/custody-of-a-child-conceived-by-artificial-insemination-47245 (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
158
For an example of this kind of statute, see MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(d) (2018).
159
Id.
160
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES, 4
(2019).
161
Id.
162
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
163
See Parentage/Paternity, CALIFORNIA COURTS, https://www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-parentage.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en&print=1 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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Moreover, a married person’s parental rights, having been established
at birth, are not defeasible if the other spouse decides to move away with
the children.164 Courts may allocate custody and other parental rights
and responsibilities between spouses in a divorce, but a divorce does not
terminate parentage.165
It might be argued that married and unmarried parents are not
similarly situated because a biological relationship between a spouse
and a child born to the other spouse during a marriage is the couple’s
biological child by virtue of the presumption of legitimacy but an unmarried mother’s boyfriend or girlfriend may or may not have a biological relationship with the child.166 Assisted reproduction statutes are intended to declare a person to be the parent of a child even in the absence
of a biological relationship.167 They would not be needed if the presumption of legitimacy were conclusive.168 They are needed when the presumption is rebuttable by proof that a person other than the husband is
a child’s biological father, as is the case is in most states.169 Spouses of
married women and the partners of unmarried women who consent to
become parents through the woman’s use of ART are similarly situated
with respect to the intent to be a parent of a child to whom one is not
biologically related.170 Gamete donors for married and unmarried persons are similarly situated with respect to their potential liability for parental responsibilities such as child support and with respect to their intent not to become parents.171 The fundamental right of procreation is
not restricted to married persons.172 Discrimination with respect to it is

164

Id.
WILLIAM A.H. SAMMONS & JENNIFER M. LEWIS, DON’T DIVORCE YOUR KIDS: PROTECTING
THEIR RIGHTS AND YOUR HAPPINESS (1999).
166
De Facto Parents: Parenthood Status Should Depend on Relationship Between Parent and
Child, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu-wa.org/print/news/de-facto-parents-parenthood-status-should-depend-relationship-between-parent-and-child (last visited Nov.
10, 2019).
167
Elizabeth J. Levy, Virgin Fathers: Paternity Law, Assisted Reproductive Technology, and
the Legal Bias against Gay Dads, 22 AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 893, 899-900.
168
Id.
169
Naomi R. Cahn & June R. Carbone, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of Unintentional
Parenthood, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511, 513 (2017).
170
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 160, at 1.
171
Lisa Luetkemeyer & Kimela West, Paternity Law: Sperm Donors, Surrogate Mothers and
Child Custody, 112 MO. MED. 162, 163 (2015).
172
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972). Strictly speaking, the right of procreation is a right of decision-making autonomy with respect to procreation, not an enforceable right to have children. The right does not
impose an affirmative obligation on the part of a state to provide people with free access to any
medical services that may be needed to make it happen. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316
165
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presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny analysis.173
If a sterile married person has a legally protected right to procreate using
ART, what compelling interest is served by denying sterile single individuals the same right?
It might be contended that states have a compelling interest in
preserving “traditional families” and that marriage is part of the concept
of traditional families.174 The Court has certainly expressed great reverence for the institution of marriage.175 Indeed, it has waxed poetic at
times.176 The Court has never held, however, that a state has a compelling interest in preserving a vision of what it considers “traditional families” per se.177 To the contrary, as Obergefell demonstrates, the Court
has consistently rejected the argument that exalting traditional notions
about marriage is a compelling justification for discriminatory state action.178
Some see the Court’s aggrandizement of marriage in Obergefell
as diminishing, or at least threatening a diminution of, the rights of unmarried persons.179 “[T]he decision’s veneration of marriage might be
interpreted as signaling that robust constitutional protections for nonmarriage are unavailable if marriage is widely available.”180 This concern is understandable, but it must be remembered that the Court has

(1980) (holding that the constitutional right of abortion does not impose an affirmative obligation upon government to subsidize them). A state may not place obstacles in the way of a person’s exercise of freedom of choice but “it need not remove those not of its own creation.” Id.
A statute conditioning the exercise of the right to procreate using ART on marriage is an obstacle
of a state’s own making. See id.
173
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
174
Kritchevsky, supra note 153, at 17.
175
George W. Dent, The Defense of Traditional Marriage, CASE W. RES. U. J. OF L. & POL.
515, 608 (1999).
176
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94 (2015) (“transcendant importance of marriage” and its “centrality. . .to the human condition”); Id. at 2608 (“embodies
a love that may endure even past death”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24
(1989) (“sanctity”); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“basic civil right[] of man”).
177
Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 GEO. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 397, 401 (2001).
178
““If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could
serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.
This Court has rejected that approach,” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U. S. 558, 566–67 (2003); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
179
See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality,
104 CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1258 (2016) (asserting that “a victory for marriage equality comes at
the expense of the unmarried and nonmarriage”).
180
Id. at 1248.
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expressed reverence for nonmarital relationships, too.181 And this reverence has not been invoked only for the benefit of same-sex couples.182
Eisenstadt v. Baird183 vindicated the fundamental right of unmarried
women to access contraceptives on the same terms as married women.184
Same-sex relationships were not at issue in that case.185
In the course of expounding upon the importance of marriage to
both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, Justice Kennedy remarked that
“[m]arriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests.”186 Although this was obiter dictum, it seems to
suggest that the Court might find nothing objectionable in a statute that
reserves the right of personal autonomy with respect to procreation exclusively to married persons.187 Because the Court did not have the issue
before it, though, it did not inquire into the question whether marriage
relationships really are more permanent and stable than other kinds of
relationships or not.188 It did not need to consider, for example, the effect of no-fault divorce laws and other factors on the supposed “permanency” of marriage.189 It did not need to consider whether the stability
that marriage offers, if any, is or should be the sole or primary determinant of—or even relevant at all to— what is in a child’s best interests.190
It seems likely that if the Court had intended to retract its repeated assertions that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best

181

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down prohibitions
against sexual intercourse between unmarried persons); see also Murray, supra note 179, at
1226 (describing Lawrence as speaking “movingly—even reverently—about the transcendence of nonmarital sexual relationships”).
182
See e.g. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
183
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
184
Id. at 443.
185
Id.
186
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2600 (2015).
187
Id.
188
Id. at 2593.
189
The divorce rate increased by nearly 50% during the first 10 years after California enacted
the first no-fault divorce law in 1970. Sally C. Clarke, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990, 43 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 1, 2 fig. 1 (1995). The number of
divorces tripled during the 20-year span from 1961 to 1981. Id. The precise impact of no-fault
divorce on divorce rates is uncertain. Divorce rates were already on the rise before 1970, suggesting that factors other than no-fault divorce played at least some role in increasing divorce
rates. Id.
190
See, e.g., S.F. 1191, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015) (removing “stability” from the
definition of “best interests of the child” for purposes of custody determinations); see also
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2018).
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interests of their children”191—even when the parent in question is single192—it would have waited until the facts of a case before it necessitated such a radical reversal of position.
Statutory schemes that grant married persons, but not unmarried
persons, a right to become parents using ART are not narrowly tailored
to protect the best interests of children.193 There is no evidence that unmarried couples are worse parents than married couples are or that children of married parents have superior developmental outcomes.194 A
correlation between parental relationship transitions and adverse impacts on child development exists,195 but correlation is not cause.196 In
any event, the correlation has no bearing on whether being raised by a
couple in a long-term, committed, nonmarital relationship is worse for
children than being raised by a married couple that could easily become
divorced at any time.197 A good case can be made that it isn’t.198
States also have a legitimate interest in ensuring that children are
adequately supported.199 Denying unmarried couples the right to procreate using ART is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to further that
interest, though.200 The same objective could be achieved by declaring
that unmarried fathers, like married fathers, are responsible for the support of their children.201 That is already the law in every state.202
191

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).
193
Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Doners, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.
J. 185, 189 (2003).
194
Mary Parke, Are Married Parents Really Better for Children? What Research Says About
the Effects of Family Structure on Child Well-Being, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2003).
195
Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Family Instability and Child Well-Being, 72 AM. SOC.
REV. 181, 201 (2007).
196
Id.
197
See, e.g., Marilyn Coleman, Lawrence H. Ganong, & Mark Fine, Reinvestigating Remarriage: Another Decade of Progress, 62 J. MARR. & FAM. 1288, 1292 (2000) (reporting research
finding that children whose parents have remarried do not have higher levels of well-being than
children in single-parent families).
198
Id.
199
Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 851 (Vt. 1994).
200
Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 669, 679–80 (1985).
201
Child Welfare Information Gateway, The Rights of Unmarried Fathers (2018)
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf.
202
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3901(West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119A, § 2 (2018);
MINN. STAT. § 257.66 (2018); Erika M. Hiester, Child Support Statutes and the Father’s
Right Not to Procreate, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 218–22 (2004). The federal government
requires states to establish procedures for determining parentage and enforcing child support
obligations of unmarried fathers in order to receive welfare grants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669b
(2016).
192
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In view of the Court’s history of respect for the individual right
of procreational autonomy of both married and single people,203 and because of the country’s history of discrimination against “illegitimate”
children (as they were once called), something more than a rational basis
is needed to justify a statutory classification that is based on the marital
status of a child’s parent.204 While Supreme Court decisions in this area
can be difficult to reconcile,205 it is clear that a state’s interest in discouraging unmarried persons from conceiving children does not justify
denying a child a right to the support of the child’s parent in circumstances where the child would be entitled to such support if the parents
had been married to each other.206 State laws that deny children of unmarried couples the rights of support that children of married parents
enjoy unreasonably discriminate on the basis of marital status in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.207
State legislatures should abide by constitutional requirements
and adopt the recommendation of the NCCUSL, the American Bar Association, and the Task Force.208 They should make assisted reproduction laws applicable to both married and unmarried couples.209

203

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)
205
Baker, supra note 22, at 1694 (concluding that “[t]here is simply no way to reconcile all
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy cases with each other”); Compare Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 275–76 (1978) (holding that classifications on the basis need only be “related to
the important state interests the statute is intended to promote”), with Trimble, 430 U.S. at
767 (declining to apply deferential scrutiny and insisting that review in this area “is not a
toothless one”).
206
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774–76; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust”); Scott E. Isaacson,
Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980 BYU. L. REV.
142, 144 (1980).
207
Weber, 406 U.S. at 165, 170. Cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69, 71–72 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional a statute granting children of married parents but not children of unmarried parents a right of recovery for the wrongful death of a parent).
208
American Bar Association, Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (February 2008), 42 FAM. L.Q. 171, 175 (2008), https://www.americanbar.org/ content/dam/aba/publishing/family_law_quarterly/family_flq_artmodelact.authcheckdam.pdf.
209
GLAD, Protecting Families No Matter How They Are Formed, https://www.glad.org/protecting-families-no-matter-how-they-are-formed/.
204
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D. SINGLE WOMEN
Many women desire to use ART to procreate without at the same
time wishing to be involved in a relationship with another person.210 Yet
only ten jurisdictions have statutes that both protect gamete donors and
apply even when a single woman is the recipient.211 Again, procreational
decision-making is a constitutionally protected fundamental right.212 To
fail to extend this protection to the decision to conceive a child using
ART instead of sexual intercourse “would be to disregard the underlying
principle of procreative freedom, namely the right of a person to have
children.”213
Limiting the right to become a parent through ART to couples is
neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.214 It might be argued that children fare better when they are supported by two parents rather than one, or that allowing single women to
use assisted reproduction to procreate creates a risk of increasing a
state’s welfare rolls.215 The risk that sperm donation to unmarried
women will increase a state’s welfare costs is very slight, though.216 It
could reasonably be argued that whatever small risk there is does not

210

Clinics are not required to keep records of the number, so reliable data on single women
who use artificial insemination to conceive do not exist. Jessica Yadegaran, No Mr. Right? More
Women Start Families via Artificial Insemination, MERCURY NEWS (June 26, 2018),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2010/08/13/no-mr-right-more-women-start-families-via-artificial-insemination/. Some in the infertility industry put the number at about 50,000 per year. Id.
This is a significant increase since 1987, when it was estimated that approximately 8,600 single
women had used donor insemination. Vicki L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the
Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination
and a Model for Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 288 (1993) (citing U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY—BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (1988)).
211
CAL. FAM,. CODE § 7613 (West 2019); D.C. CODE § 16-401 (2017); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
46/702 (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 19A, § 1922 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.660 (2013); N.H. REV.
STAT. § 168-B:2 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-60
(2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 701 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 (2018).
212
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942).
213
Nicole L. Cucci, Note, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures,
72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 417, 427–28 (1998). see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. L:aFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (stating that “[t]his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
214
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 542.
215
Paula Fomby & Andrew J. Cherlin, Family Instability and Child Well-Being, 72 AM. SOC.
REV. 181, 201 (2007).
216
ROBERTSON, supra note 138.
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justify reducing single women’s reproduction options by imposing parental responsibilities on sperm donors.217 More importantly, these arguments assume that women are incapable of supporting themselves
and their children without help from somebody else.218 Classifications
based on sex-based generalizations and stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause.219 Because women are not necessarily dependent on
others for support, a classification based on a woman’s relationship status alone is not narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of ensuring that
children are adequately supported.220
There does not appear to be any rational justification for granting
or denying donors protection from parental responsibilities depending
on whether their gametes are used by a married woman, a woman with
a boyfriend or girlfriend, or a single woman.221 State statutes should be
amended to accommodate women who wish to procreate using ART but
who do not necessarily wish to become involved in a relationship with
217

Id.
See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979).
219
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) struck down a statute that provided for government aid to the children of unemployed fathers but not to children of unemployed mothers.
The Court explained that the presumption that “the father has the ‘primary responsibility to
provide a home and its essentials,…’ while the mother is the ‘center of home and family life,”
is “part of the ‘baggage of sexual stereotypes” and not a legitimate ground for governmentimposed sex classifications. Id. at 89. see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special
protection”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (characterizing as an invalid basis
for state action ‘increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the
home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas’”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by
an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in particular effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (explaining that legislation is particularly violative of the Equal Protection Clause when it “serves
to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities
of men and women”).
220
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 130–31.
221
“Under the current statute, donors have no legal protection when single women are inseminated and could theoretically be held liable for child support. Also, the legal status of the
child is in question.” Cork, supra note 16, at 1559. See also Henry, supra note 210, at 290
(discussing the law’s deficiencies in protecting the rights of unmarried biological mothers
and their offspring). Post-1973 versions of the UPA “shield[] all donors, whether of sperm or
eggs… from parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman
conceives a child through ART with the intent to be the child’s parent, either by herself or
with a man, as provided in sections 703 and 704.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2002). California has long honored the procreational rights of single women.
See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he California Legislature has afforded unmarried as well as married women a statutory vehicle for obtaining semen for artificial insemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity”).
218
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another person. All gamete donors should be protected regardless of
whether their recipients are married or single.
E. LEGAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTAGE
Minnesota Statutes section 257.54 provides:
The parent and child relationship between a child and:
(a) the biological mother may be established by proof of
her having given birth to the child, or under sections
257.51 to 257.74 or 257.75;
(b) the biological father may be established under sections 257.51 to 257.74 or 257.75; or
(c) an adoptive parent may be established by proof of
adoption.222
This statute, like those of a number of other states, assumes that
there can be only two kinds of parents: biological and adoptive.223 To
accommodate the phenomenon of married couples using artificial insemination to conceive, the NCCUSL created a legal fiction that a husband whose wife conceives using artificial insemination is the child’s
“natural father” even though he does not really have any biological relationship to the child at all.224
Instead of trying to squeeze children of assisted reproduction
into an outdated binary, it would make more sense to simply recognize
three kinds of parentage: biological, adoptive, and legal. Under this rubric, a biological parent would be one who has a biological (genetic)
relationship with a child, an adoptive parent would be one who formally
adopts a child, and a legal parent would be one whom the law recognizes
as the child’s parent for whatever reason, whether it is a biological relationship, an adoptive relationship, an acknowledgement of parentage,
an unrebutted presumption, or assisted reproduction. It is inaccurate and
unnecessarily confusing to maintain a legal fiction that people who have

222

MINN. STAT. § 257.54 (2018).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-707(5) (2006), IND. CODE § 31-9-2-88 (2011), KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.710(14) (West 2005), MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-102(2) (2017), and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-13(f) (West 2013) (defining the parent-child relationship as being
based on either a biological or an adoptive relationship). The UPA 1973 defines “parent and
child relationship” as the “legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
224
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
223
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no biological relationship to a child are the child’s “biological” parents.225
The UPA 2017 recognizes that people can become parents in
more than two ways.226 It provides that a parent-child relationship exists
between a person and a child if:
(1) the individual gives birth to the child . . .;
(2) there is a presumption under Section 204 of the individual’s parentage of the child . . .;
(3) the individual is adjudicated a parent of the child . . .;
(4) the individual adopts the child;
(5) the individual acknowledges parentage of the child
under . . .; or
(6) the individual [is a parent of a child born through assisted reproductive technology].227
This approach is not only less confusing; it also has the benefit
of being truthful and gender neutral.228
F. CONSENT
The UPA 1973 and statutes adopting or patterned after it condition a husband’s parentage of a child that his wife conceives by assisted
reproduction on both spouses signing a written consent.229 Consent is a
critical element of parentage through assisted reproduction.230 Without
it, people could be made parents of biologically unrelated children
against their wills.231 The requirement that the consent be in writing and

225

Fixation on biological relatedness also “undermines contemporary movements to recognize family forms that are not and could not be rooted in genetic connection.” Baker, supra note
22, at 1695.
226
See infra text accompanying notes 227-28.
227
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
228
See generally Jennifer Sroka, Note, A Mother Yesterday, but not Today: Deficiencies of
the Uniform Parentage Act for Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships, 47 VAL. U.
L. REV. 137 (2013) (criticizing earlier versions of the UPA because they provided that a parentchild relationship between a woman and a child could come about only by birth or adoption).
229
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
230
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
231
Id.
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signed also makes sense.232 The parent-child relationship is too important to be decided on the basis of oral allegations alone.233 The requirement raises some questions that will need to be addressed, however.
1. The Effect of Noncompliance
The UPA 1973 is silent about the consequences of failure to
comply with the requirement that consent must be in writing and signed
by both spouses.234 This can be a problem. Except in the case of surrogacy, it is generally understood that giving birth is enough to establish
a mother’s parentage of a child.235 Therefore, people could reasonably
believe that a birth mother’s signature on a consent to become a parent
is unnecessary.236 If the birth mother therefore neglects to sign the form,
should the consequence be that the child she conceives and delivers will
not have a parent-child relationship with the spouse who signed the
form? Should the gamete donor be on the hook for eighteen years of
child support? These seem like harsh penalties for an honest, reasonable
mistake. Members of the Task Force probably had questions like these
in mind when they observed that greater clarity is needed for determining who will be recognized as a child’s parent(s) in assisted reproduction
cases when people fail to comply with statutory requirements.237
Some states have enacted statutes providing that an intended
parent’s failure to comply with statutory requirements does not give a
sperm donor a right to claim biological parentage.238 This is not a completely satisfactory solution, however, because it leaves open the possibility that somebody else (such as the intended parents, the child, or a
child support agency) could claim the donor is the child’s parent.239 People who want to be parents probably are not inclined to claim the sperm
donor is the father, but an intended parent could change his or her mind
232

Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of
Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 69 (1974) (describing rationales for requiring contracts to be in
writing and signed).
233
Id.
234
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (showing the lack
of explicit consequences for failure of parents to comply with the written consent requirement).
235
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
236
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 13.
237
Id. at 24.
238
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) (2018).
239
See MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 2(b)(1) (2018) (authorizing a child support agency to
commence an action to declare that a man whom genetic tests determine within the specified
degree of accuracy is a child’s biological father, is the child’s father).
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if the relationship between the intended parents deteriorates.240 Should
an intended parent be able to use a defect like the mother’s failure to
sign her name to the consent form as a basis for asserting that a sperm
donor is the child’s parent? What if the mother is or becomes a recipient
of public assistance and the child support agency commences a paternity
action naming the sperm donor as the father?241
The UPA 2000 and 2002 address the consequences of noncompliance.242 Section 703 provides: “A man who provides sperm for, or
consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in Section
704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”243 This makes it clear that the omission of the mother’s signature does not destroy the effectiveness of the consent form to establish
the other person’s parentage.244 Section 704 provides that the failure to
sign a consent does not preclude a finding that a man is the father if he
lives with and openly holds out the child as his own during the first two
years of the child’s life.245 The Task Force recommended adoption of
these provisions because they “provide substantially clearer direction to
the court to determine which man will be recognized as the child’s father
in assisted reproduction cases where there is no clear consent by husband.”246
Consent is not a necessary condition precedent to nonbiological
parentage.247 An unrelated person who lives with and openly holds a
child out as his or her own may be presumed to be the child’s parent.248
The rule should not be different merely because ART is involved.249 Of
course, if Section 704 is enacted, then the wording of the “holding out

240

See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J. OF L. &
FEMINISM 211 (2012) (discusses issues regarding intended parents and ART).
241
See MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 2(b)(1) (2018) (authorizing a child support agency to
commence an action to declare that a man whom genetic tests determine within the specified
degree of accuracy is a child’s biological father, is the child’s father).
242
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 704(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that if a man openly holds out the child as his own
during the first two years of life, failure to sign a consent does not preclude him from fatherhood).
246
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 24.
247
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
248
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (2018); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2017).
249
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating if the two parties hold the child out as their own the court can find consent to parentage, which speaks to the
idea that this should naturally extend to ART).
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as one’s child” presumption in a state’s statutes should be harmonized
with it.250
What should the consequences of the failure of both spouses to
sign a written consent to the use of a third party’s gametes be? In practice, married couples do not always realize that they need to sign a written consent form if they both want to be parents of a child that one of
them conceives using ART.251 Some courts have relied on common law
or equitable doctrines to hold that both spouses are parents of a child of
assisted reproduction if there is evidence that both spouses, although not
putting it in writing, consented in fact.252 Other courts rigidly apply the
written consent requirement.253 Recognizing that rigid application of the
written consent requirement can produce inequitable results and harm
children, the UPA 2017 allows the written consent to be signed before,
at or after the child’s birth.254 It dispenses with the requirement of a writing altogether if there is clear and convincing evidence of the existence
of an oral agreement that the parties intended to be parents of the child,
provided the agreement was made prior to conception.255
As is the case under earlier versions of the UPA, the UPA 2017
does not require a writing if a person resides with and holds the child
out as his or her own for two years.256 In this situation, it is not even
necessary to prove the existence of an oral agreement.257
The UPA 2017 adds more detail to the “holding out as one’s own
child” provision.258 It specifies that in the absence of a writing, parentage might be established by proof that
the woman and the individual for the first two years of
the child’s life, including any period of temporary absence, resided together in the same household with the
child and both openly held out the child as the individ-

250

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
252
See, e.g., In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (reasoning that “if an
unmarried man who biologically causes conception through sexual relations without the premeditated intent of birth is legally obligated to support a child, then the equivalent resulting
birth of a child caused by the deliberate conduct of artificial insemination should receive the
same treatment in the eyes of the law”).
253
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)..
254
Id. § 704(b).
255
Id. § 704(b)(1).
256
Id. § 704(b)(2).
257
Id. § 704(b)(2).
258
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
251
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ual’s child, unless the individual dies or becomes incapacitated before the child attains two years of age or the
child dies before the child attains two years of age, in
which case the court may find consent under this subsection to parentage if a party proves by clear-and-convincing evidence that the woman and the individual intended
to reside together in the same household with the child
and both intended the individual would openly hold out
the child as the individual’s child, but the individual was
prevented from carrying out that intent by death or incapacity.259
This language provides much clearer guidance for the application of the “holding out as one’s own” principle than existing statutes
do.260
2. Multiple Consents, Multiple Parents
When the NCCUSL substituted man for husband, and woman
for wife, in 2002 to make the UPA applicable to both married and unmarried couples, little thought seems to have been given to the possibility that an unmarried person might have more than one “significant
other.”261 Bigamous marriages are void,262 so a woman can have only
one husband at a time.263 Therefore, a law declaring that a husband who
consents to his wife’s conception using ART is the father can result in
only one man being the father.264 There is no law against an unmarried
woman having multiple boyfriends or girlfriends, however.265 If she secures consents to her use of ART from more than one of them, then the
child will have multiple parents.

259

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55 subd. 1(d) (2015) (stating simply that a man is presumed
to be a child’s father if “while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child”).
261
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
262
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-7-1 (2018).
263
Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 DUKE L.J. 79, 86
(2017).
264
See, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) §703 (stating that an individual who
consents to be the parent of a child conceived by ART is the parent of the child).
265
See Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted Reproductive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 175, 176 (2018) (describing the increased recognition of polyamory relationships).
260
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While this scenario may seem fanciful, it really is not. The days
of lifelong commitments to one person are gone.266 It is possible for successive or concurrent boyfriends or girlfriends of the same woman to
sign ART consent forms, each intending at the time to become parents
and each therefore becoming parents of the child that the woman ultimately conceives using ART.267
Commentators have suggested that children should not be limited to only two parents.268 Some states even authorize courts to declare
that a child has more than two parents.269 These states are proceeding
very cautiously, though. The California statute, for example, allows a
court to recognize more than two parents of a child only if it finds that
being limited to two parents would be detrimental to the child.270
Under parentage statutes other than those dealing with ART, it
is possible for more than one man to be the presumed father of a child.271
In these situations, a court must determine, based on public policy considerations, which presumption should prevail.272 ART statutes do not

266
Anjani Chandra, et al., HIV Risk-Related Behaviors in the United States Household Population Aged 15-44 Years: Data from the National Survey of Family Growth, 2002 and 20062010, 46 NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REP. 1, 8 fig. 3 (2012); Anjani Chandra, et al., Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States: Data from the 2006-2008
National Survey of Family Growth, 36 NAT’L HEALTH STATISTICS REP. 1, 17–18 (2011); William
D. Mosher, et al., Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures: Men and Women 15-44 Years
of Age, United States, 2002, 362 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 2 fig.
1–2 (2005).
267
See generally, Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 309
(2007).
268
Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 173 (2008) (stating that there should be a three-parent framework available for same-sex couples); Nancy E.
Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 231–32 (2007) (arguing
that in the age of birthfathers, stepfathers, and psychological fathers there should be a more
flexible understanding of what constitutes a “legal father”); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 309 (2007) (declaring that the “nuclear family” model is outdated); Polikoff, supra note 7, at 267 (arguing that children should not have to suffer because
their parents are of the same sex).
269
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2018) (stating “a court may find that more than
two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents”); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, §
1853 (2018) (stating “a court may determinate that a child has more than 2 parents”).
270
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2018).
271
See MINN. STAT. § 257.55 subd. 2 (2018) (addressing the determination of paternity when
two or more men are presumed to be a child’s father).
272
Id. (stating “[T]he presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls”).
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merely create presumptions; they declare who is and who is not a parent.273 There is currently nothing in any version of the UPA explicitly
requiring courts to assign only two parents to a child of assisted reproduction.274
One way to address this problem would be to specify that there
can be only one valid ART consent form per child. If this approach is
taken, then a framework for deciding which of two or more consent
forms is valid will be needed. In terms of effectuating the parties ’probable intent, a rule that the latest consent supersedes all previously executed ones might make sense. If a woman and another person sign an
ART consent and the woman later signs one with a different person, it
would probably be reasonable to infer that the woman has broken up
with the first person and now wants her new “significant other” to be a
parent with her instead. It is not entirely clear, however, that a “last in
time” rule would necessarily be the correct one to apply in every case.
Consider, for example, the following scenario: Amy is dating
Paula. They want to have children, so they sign an ART consent. Before
conception occurs, however, they split up and Amy starts dating Charlene. Charlene doesn’t really have a strong interest in being a parent, but
she figures it will be worth it to sign an ART consent form to keep Amy
happy. Amy subsequently becomes pregnant using sperm from an anonymous donor. Panicking, Charlene moves out. At Amy’s invitation,
Paula moves back in. Immediately after the child’s birth, Paula and Amy
establish a home together. Excited to be a new parent and having no
reason to think her consent is no longer valid, Paula treats the child as
her own for the first two years of the child’s life. The last anyone heard
from Charlene she had joined a motorcycle gang in New Orleans.
Who should the law declare to be Amy’s co-parent here—Paula
or Charlene? From the child’s, the mother’s, Paula’s, and probably Charlene’s point of view, it should be Paula. Applying the “last in time” rule,
though, Charlene would be Paula’s co-parent.

273

See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1973) (declaring that when a married woman receives donor semen, her husband is legally the natural father);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (declaring that a sperm donor is
not the natural father of a child unless he consents); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703 (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2017) (declaring that a sperm donor is not the natural father of a child unless he
consents).
274
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (omitting any explicit requirement that
courts assign only two parents to a child of assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2002) (omitting any explicit requirement that courts assign only two parents to a
child of assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (omitting any
explicit requirement that courts assign only two parents to a child of assisted reproduction).
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A better rule might be that when two or more ART consents for
the same child exist, they give rise only to rebuttable presumptions of
paternity. This is how Minnesota law deals with multiple recognitions
of parentage for the same child.275 If this kind of rule were enacted, then
both Paula and Charlene would have the benefit of the multiple consents
presumption but only Paula could invoke the “holding out as one’s
child” presumption. When parentage presumptions conflict, the UPA
directs courts to decide which one to apply based on policy considerations.276 Accordingly, a court could choose to apply the “holding out”
presumption to favor Paula over Charlene.
3. Withdrawal of Consent
The UPA 1973 did not address the possibility that an individual
might withdraw consent.277 The 2002 and 2017 versions of the UPA provide that if a person withdraws consent before placement of the eggs,
sperm or embryos, then he or she is not the parent of the resulting
child.278 This would be a reasonable rule to adopt, as it would prevent
an individual from being made a parent against his or her will. Giving
effect to withdrawals should also help reduce the frequency of multipleconsent problems.
The UPA 2017 requires written notice of withdrawal to be given
to the woman who agreed to give birth to the child.279 Notice also must

275

MINN. STAT. §§ 257.55 subd. 1(g), 2 (2018).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (“If two or more
presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls”). The UPA 2017 provides
considerably more specificity, directing “court[s] [to] adjudicate parentage in the best interest
of the child, based on: (1) the age of the child; (2) the length of time during which each individual
assumed the role of parent of the child; (3) the nature of the relationship between the child and
each individual; (4) the harm to the child if the relationship between the child and each individual is not recognized; (5) the basis for each individual’s claim to parentage of the child; and (6)
other equitable factors arising from the disruption of the relationship between the child and each
individual or the likelihood of other harm to the child.” “If an individual challenges parentage
based on the results of genetic testing, in addition to the factors listed in subsection (a), the
court shall consider: (1) the facts surrounding the discovery the individual might not be a genetic
parent of the child; and (2) the length of time between the time that the individual was placed
on notice that the individual might not be a genetic parent and the commencement of the proceeding.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
277
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
278
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
279
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
276
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be given to the clinic or health care provider, but failure to notify a clinic
or health care provider does not affect the parentage of the child.280
4. Informed Consent
The American Bar Association has proposed that states enact
legislation to provide that “[i]nformed consent must be provided by all
participants prior to the commencement of assisted reproduction.”281
The proposal would require every participant to be informed, orally and
in writing, of the following things, among others: the right to withdraw
consent; the known and potential risks, consequences and benefits of
ART; the possibility of unforeseen legal consequences; the advisability
of seeking legal counsel; other routes to parentage, including adoption
and sexual intercourse; confidentiality rights and obligations; rights of
access to medical information about donors; and information about who
has the right to possession and control of embryos or gametes.282
While this kind of information can be beneficial to gamete donors and people who wish to use ART to conceive children, a state that
enacts an informed consent statute for assisted reproduction should
make it clear that failure to provide the required information will not
affect the validity of consent for purposes of determining a child’s parentage. Informed consent laws normally are enacted for the purpose of
defining the scope of the consent defense in cases involving patient
claims against health care providers, not to determine who a child’s parents are.283 It would not be sound public policy to deprive a child of an
intended parent and declare a sperm donor the child’s parent merely because a person was informed in writing but not orally that adoption is
also a way of becoming a parent, for example.
5. Minors
No version of the UPA addresses the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted reproduction or when it may be withdrawn.284 Because
280

Id.
MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH § 201 (2008).
282
Id.
283
Martin R. Struder, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protecting the Patient’s Right to
Make Informed Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REV. 85, 85 (1987).
284
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)(failing to address the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)(failing to address the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted reproduction); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)(failing to address the validity of a minor’s consent to assisted reproduction).
281
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minors do not have a fully developed capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of their actions, the contracts into which they
enter generally are voidable at their option.285 This is why some states
allow a minor to vacate a recognition of parentage upon attaining the
age of majority, and why a recognition form signed by a minor operates
only as a presumption of parentage, not a determination of parentage.286
One of the reasons the Task Force rejected the UPA 2000 was that it
failed to distinguish between adults and minors in connection with the
signing of documents that have the effect of making an individual a parent.287 It is a valid criticism. An assisted reproduction statute could provide that a minor may withdraw consent at any time until he or she attains the age of majority or the time the gametes or embryo are placed,
whichever is later.
6. The Effect of Divorce, Annulment, Legal Separation, or Death
Several states have addressed the effect a dissolution of marriage
has on a spouse’s consent to the other spouse’s use of ART to conceive.288 Under the UPA 2002, a person who signs a consent does not
become a parent if the sperm, eggs, or embryos have not been placed at
the time of the divorce.289 The consenting spouse will be a parent if the
gametes are placed before the divorce or if the spouse consented in writing that the spouse would be a parent of the child if the placement occurs
after a divorce.290 These provisions reflect probable intent.291 It can probably be safely assumed that most people do not wish to conceive babies
with a former spouse.292 An exception could be made for those couples

Richard A. Lord, 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed. 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
286
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.57 subd. 2(4) (2018) (stating that a minor has the right to
vacate within six months of turning eighteen) & MINN. STAT. § 257.75 subd. 9 (2018) (presumption of parentage).
287
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8.
288
See ALA. CODE § 26-17-706 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §19-4-106 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 8-706 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1926 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.700 (2019);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-706 (2019); N.D.. CENT. CODE § 14-20-64 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 160.706 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-706 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15C, § 706 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.275 (2018)
(repealed 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-906 (2019).
289
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
290
Id.
291
Id. § 702 cmt.
292
See generally April Wilder, Strings Attached: What Happens When You Get Pregnant with
Your Ex-Husband? (Feb. 2014) http://www.oprah.com/spirit/april-wilder-pregnancy-after-divorce/all.
285
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who clearly express an intention to become parents with a person from
whom they have become divorced.293
The UPA 2002 does not address legal separations or annulments.294 The UPA 2017 gives these the same effect as divorces.295
There does not appear to be any valid policy reason for distinguishing
between divorces and other kinds of proceedings that terminate a marriage relationship.296 Neither the consenting spouse nor the donor should
become a parent if the other spouse unilaterally decides to proceed with
the placement after the parties have split up, whether the placement occurs after a divorce, an annulment, or a decree of legal separation.
Under the UPA 2017, a former spouse will not be a parent if a
transfer of gametes or an embryo occurs after the marriage is terminated
or if consent is withdrawn before transfer.297 The Task Force recommended a requirement that divorce proceedings address custody of biological materials (sperm, eggs, zygotes, embryos, and the like) that exist
in storage.298 Given the profound impact an individual’s unilateral decision to have a child using another person’s gametes can have on the
other person’s life and on the lives of child(ren) that are conceived this
way, this seems like a reasonable requirement.299 It should also apply to
legal separations and annulments.
These rules are not easily adaptable to unmarried couples.300
They are not similarly situated with married couples in this respect.301
There is no formal procedure like divorce or annulment for ending a
nonmarital relationship.302 Consequently, in the absence of a stipulation,
the date of termination of a relationship is not as easily determined.303
Foreseeably, courts could find themselves being called upon to decide a
child’s parentage based on whether people intended a permanent termination of their relationship or only a trial separation. There is no formal
procedure for re-establishing a nonmarital relationship (also known as
293

Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1999).
294
Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Paternity of Marital
Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 67 (2003).
295
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
296
Trisha Zeller, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, Ch. 6, § 63.02 (2019).
297
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (explaining that a “transfer” occurs at the time gametes or an embryo are placed in a woman’s body).
298
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 26.
299
Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with Known Sperm
Providers: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 62 (2016).
300
June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 Md. L. Rev. 55, 95 (2016).
301
Id. at 96.
302
Id. at 70.
303
Id. at 96.
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“getting

back together”), either. Thought would need to be given to the
question whether consent is automatically revived when a couple reunites after a breakup, and the level and kind of proof that would be
needed to establish that a reunion was mutually intended to be permanent (as distinguished from a trial reunion, for example.) It might be
more expedient to require withdrawals of consent for unmarried couples
to be made expressly rather than implied from the termination of the
relationship.
Legislators should also give some consideration to the effect of
death on a person’s consent. It probably may be assumed that people
generally do not wish to conceive children after they are dead. Accordingly, a statute declaring an ART consent void if gamete or embryo
transfer has not taken place before the donor dies would make sense. An
exception could be recognized for cases in which the donor has clearly
expressed a contrary intention. The UPA 2017 contains suggested language for such a provision.304
G. LICENSED PHYSICIAN OR DONATION FACILITY
The UPA 1973 and statutes adopting or patterned on it required
assisted reproduction to be supervised by a licensed physician.305 This
requirement does not appear in later versions of the UPA.306 California
has retained at least some form of it.307 The Task Force was concerned
that without it, a woman’s sexual partner might try to avoid parental
responsibility by claiming that he only donated sperm artificially rather
than by having sexual intercourse.308
Retaining the requirement of either a licensed physician or a licensed gamete bank raises a thorny question: What happens if the physician or gamete bank does not have a valid license? It seems unfair that
the intended parents, the donor, and the child of the intended parents
could be thwarted by a physician’s failure to pay a license renewal fee,
for example.309
304

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Texas has already enacted a statute addressing this contingency. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2018).
305
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
306
Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899,
909 (2012).
307
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2019) (dispensing with the requirement if a licensed gamete bank is used).
308
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 9.
309
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 390 (Ct. App. 1986) & E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20
A.3d 1171, 1175–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) strictly applied statutes mandating physician supervision. Those cases, however, involved individuals who did not even try to use the
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A California statute provides that a man who donates sperm to a
licensed physician or sperm bank does not become a father unless he
and the woman otherwise agree in writing before conception.310 He still
is not the father if he fails to donate to a licensed physician or sperm
bank and either (a) he and the woman agreed in a writing signed prior
to conception that he would not be a parent, or (b) a court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that he and the woman had an oral agreement
that he would not be a parent.311 On the other hand, the donor will be the
father if he fails to donate to a licensed physician or sperm bank, and he
and the woman agreed he would be a parent in a writing signed before
conception.312
These provisions have the benefit of encouraging would-be donors and recipients to enter into well-drafted consent agreements.313
They will be of little help, however, in those cases where the donor,
recipient, or both did no contingency planning because they both reasonably but mistakenly believed that the physician or gamete bank possessed a valid license.314 A good argument may be made that consent
given under these circumstances should nevertheless be considered
valid.315 States may have a legitimate interest in regulating ART clinics
and professionals, but there are less drastic means of doing that than
making the parental status of their customers depend on the professional’s or business’s regulatory compliance.316 States could achieve
their regulatory objectives by imposing criminal and/or administrative
penalties on service providers who practice a profession or operate a
business without a license, or with a revoked or suspended license.317
services of a licensed physician. Id. They are distinguishable from cases in which the parties
make a good faith effort to comply with statutory requirements. Id.
310
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2019).
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Certain forms can be used to show the intentions of parents and donors involved in the
conception of a child; these forms can serve as the foundation of a consent agreement can help
protect the rights of all involved in the process. California’s New Assisted Reproduction Law,
NATL. CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Cal-statutory-forms-assisted-reproduction.pdf.
314
See e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2) (2019).
315
See Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1–44 (1957) (explaining the rationale for making “reasonable mistake of fact” an excuse for noncompliance
with legal requirements, and the considerations relevant to it).
316
While the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) issues lengthy guidelines
to its membership, which consists of fertility clinics and sperm banks, ASRM does not sanction
those who are in violation of its guidelines. Michel Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fertility Industry, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-regulate-fertility-industry.
317
Id.
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H. ADJUDICATION OF PARENTAGE
If multiple consents to ART can result in multiple presumptions
of parentage, then a mechanism for resolving the conflict will be needed.
It is also foreseeable that disputes may arise regarding the validity of a
consent, the authenticity of a signature, or the validity or timeliness of a
withdrawal of consent. For these reasons, state statutes should authorize
parentage adjudication proceedings for children of assisted reproduction
in the same way that they authorize proceedings to adjudicate the parentage of children who are conceived through sexual intercourse.
In cases not involving assisted reproduction, state statutes typically specify who is authorized to seek a paternity adjudication.318 Care
should be taken to ensure that these statutes, in addition to being genderneutralized to accommodate same-sex couples, are clear that a person
who claims to be the legal parent of a child pursuant to the ART statute
may bring an action for an adjudication of parentage, too. Intended parents, alleged intended parents, and children of assisted reproduction
should have a right to an adjudication of parentage when necessary.319
To prevent the disruption of parent-child attachments, a legislature may want to consider establishing a limitations period for adjudications.320 The UPA 2017 would require a spouse to commence a proceeding to contest parentage of a child of assisted reproduction no later
than two years after the child’s birth.321 There is no time limit if the
spouse can prove that s/he (a) did not provide a gamete, (b) did not consent, (c) did not cohabit with the birth mother since the probable time of
assisted reproduction, and (d) never openly held out the child as his or
her own.322
The UPA 2017 provides a limitations period only for situations
in which no valid consent exists.323 The commissioners evidently as-

318

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.57, subd. 3 (2018) (listing the child, the mother, the mother’s
parent (if the mother is a minor or deceased), a man alleging himself to be the father (or a parent
of a minor or deceased alleged father), and child support agencies).
319
Cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 612 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (adding a new provision to
the UPA to specifically authorize proceedings to adjudicate the parentage of individuals who
are or are alleged to be the intended parents of children of assisted reproduction).
320
Stephen A. Sherman, You Ain’t My Baby Daddy: The Problem of Paternity Fraud and
Paternity Laws, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 273, 295–96 (2007).
321
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that the presumption of
parentage cannot be overcome once the child reaches two years of age (with two exceptions
determined by the court).
322
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that the specified time
limits would apply even if the marriage is declared invalid after assisted reproduction occurs).
323
Id.
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sumed that only an invalid consent could invalidate parentage by assisted reproduction.324 They did not anticipate the possibility that two or
more properly executed consent forms might be signed for the same
child.325 If a legislature adopts the UPA 2017 limitations periods, the
language should be made broad enough to cover situations involving
multiple consents as well those involving invalid consent.
I. GENETIC TESTING
Minnesota has enacted a statute prohibiting gamete donors from
using genetic test results to claim parentage of children conceived with
their gametes.326 A statute like this protects intended parents but it offers
no protection to gamete donors.327 It does not bar a gamete recipient, her
spouse, the child, or a child support agency from seeking to use genetic
testing to establish that the donor is the parent.328
Except in cases where the parties have failed to execute a valid
consent or have failed to comply with some other statutory ART requirement, it does not make sense to allow genetic testing to prove a
donor is the parent of a child of assisted reproduction. The objective of
assisted reproduction laws is to ensure that intended parents who use
ART to conceive a child will be recognized as the child’s legal parents
and that donors will be protected from the risk of being declared the
parents.329 Genetic testing of donors would thwart that purpose.
The UPA 2017 reflects this idea. It provides:
Genetic testing may not be used:
(1) to challenge the parentage of an individual who is a
parent under [the ART statute]; or
(2) to establish the parentage of an individual who is a
donor.330

324

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (outlining situations where a
court would determine consent to be valid).
325
Id.
326
See MINN. STAT. § 257.62, subd. 5(c) (2018) (“A determination [by genetic testing] that the
alleged father is the biological father does not . . . allow the donor of genetic material for assisted
reproduction for the benefit of a recipient parent, whether sperm or ovum (egg), to claim to be
the child’s biological or legal parent”).
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 10.
330
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
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This language makes it clear that neither the donor nor anybody
else may use genetic testing to establish that a donor is the child’s parent. “Because the parentage of an intended parent . . . is not premised on
a genetic connection, the lack of a genetic connection should not be the
basis of a challenge to the individual’s parentage.”331 On the other hand,
because a genetic connection is a component of the definition of an Indian child, an exception should be recognized for cases involving Indian
or alleged Indian children.332
J. DONOR INFORMATION
Gamete donors often prefer to remain anonymous.333 Accordingly, gamete donation agreements may contain provisions protecting
the identity of donors from being disclosed to the recipients or the
child.334 While such contracts may increase the size of the donor pool,
they can also prevent children from knowing their medical and genetic
histories.335 This information can be critical to receiving appropriate
medical care.336
The UPA 1973 required physicians to file completed ART consent forms with the state’s department of health and instructed the state
to store them confidentially and indefinitely.337 This places children of
assisted reproduction at a disadvantage relative to adopted children.338
In many states, adopted children have a right to information about their
331

Id. § 502 cmt.
See discussion infra Section IV.L.4.
333
See Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189 (2010) (explaining that prohibiting gamete donor anonymity reduces the availability of donor gametes, and erodes commitments to equality and the
prevention of commodification in the ART space).
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
“Today, approximately 1.7% of all infants born in the United States every year are conceived using ART.” Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART): ART Success Rates, CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fart%2Freports%2Findex.h
tml. This percentage is growing. Bernstein, supra note 101, at 298 (noting “that from 2004 to
2008 the number of IVF cycles used for gestational surrogacy grew by 60%, the number of
births by gestational surrogates grew by 53% and the number of babies born to gestational
surrogates grew by 89%”). “Accordingly, it is increasingly important for states to address the
right of children to access information about their gamete donor.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
337
“The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the
husband’s consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and
in a sealed file.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
338
See Naomi Cahn, Do Tell - The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1077, 1111–1112 (2013-2014).
332
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biological parents upon attaining adulthood.339 The requirement does
not appear in subsequent versions of the UPA.340
The UPA 2017 provides children of assisted reproduction a right
of access to some information about their gamete donors.341 Distinguishing between identifying and nonidentifying donor information, it balances the competing interests of children and donors by respecting a
gamete donor’s wishes regarding disclosure of the donor’s identity
while requiring gamete banks and fertility clinics to make a good faith
effort to provide nonidentifying medical information about the donor to
the child or the child’s parent upon request.342 Adopting UPA article 9
would help ensure that children of assisted reproduction receive the
same health care and legal protections that other children do.
K. SURROGACY CONTRACTS
A surrogacy contract, sometimes called a gestational agreement,
is an agreement between a woman and intended parents in which the
parties agree that the woman will become pregnant using ART and will
carry and give birth to the baby but will not have any parental rights or
responsibilities upon the baby’s birth.343 If the woman’s own eggs are
used, she is called a genetic or traditional surrogate.344 If another
woman’s eggs are used, she is called a gestational surrogate.345
The 2000, 2002, and 2017 versions of the UPA authorize surrogacy contracts.346 The NCCUSL made these provisions optional, however, because the subject is highly controversial.347 Courts in some states
have held that surrogacy contracts are void, deeming them contrary to

339
Some examples of statutes granting adopted children a right of access to information about
their birth parents include ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (2015), ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.50.500,
18.50.510 (2019), CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9202, 9203 (West 2015), and MINN. STAT. §§ 259.83,
259.89 (2018). This is not an exhaustive list.
340
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 407 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (discussing the conditions under
which a donor’s information may be released).
341
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
342
Id. § 905. The Task Force, too, recommended that children of assisted reproduction should
have access to their gamete donors ’medical information. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54,
at 25.
343
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
344
Alexus Williams, State Regulatory Efforts in Protecting a Surrogate’s Bodily Autonomy,
49 SETON HALL L. REV. 205, 209 (2018).
345
Id.
346
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
347
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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the state’s public policy against sales or transfers of human beings.348 As
of 2015, seven states and the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit
them; fourteen states authorize some, but not all, kinds of surrogacy
contracts; and the rest of the country does not have any surrogacy statute
at all.349
The Task Force recommended against enacting the surrogacy
provisions of the UPA, believing additional analysis was needed to address public policy concerns, not the least of which was whether surrogacy agreements should be permitted at all.350 Some of the concerns the
Task Force raised were: Should genetic surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, both, or neither, be allowed?351 Should fee payments be permitted?352 Should payments of expenses be permitted?353 Should payment
of lost wages be considered a fee payment or an expense reimbursement?354 Should agreements require pre-approval by a court?355 If so,
should the statute set out specific requirements for agreements or leave
judges free to exercise discretion to decide, on a case by case basis, if
the agreement will serve a child’s best interests?356 Should pre-placement counseling, evaluations, and/or home studies be required?357 What
should the effect of noncompliance with statutory requirements be?358
Should the law require each party to the contract to have independent
legal counsel?359 Their spouses?360 What effect will an intended parent’s
death before the child is born have on inheritance rights and guardianship?361

348

In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d
815, 818 (Fam. Ct. 1990). Some courts have also found them repugnant to adoption laws, on
the basis that they circumvent the measures legislatures have put in place for the protection of
adopted children (home studies, etc.) See, e.g., Anaconda Fed. Credit Union # 4401 v. West,
483 P.2d 909, 911 (Mont. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 369 (1932).
349
Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the Law, and the Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 459, 487–503 (2015).
350
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 27.
351
Id. at 31.
352
Id. at 30.
353
Id. at 28–29.
354
Id. at 29.
355
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 27.
356
Id. at 30.
357
Id. at 29–31.
358
Id. at 26.
359
Id. at 22.
360
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 22.
361
Id. at 27–32.
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Efforts to enact surrogacy legislation have had mixed results.362
In some states, unsuccessful attempts to enact a surrogacy statute have
been made several times over the course of the past decade.363 One strategy legislators commonly employ when calls for surrogacy legislation
are made is to establish a legislative commission to study the issue.364
Because surrogacy is a complicated and controversial issue, it may be
prudent to address it separately from other needed revisions to the Parentage Act, after such a commission has completed its study. The UPA
provides details throughout regarding the kinds of language that should
be used depending on whether a legislature wishes to make surrogacy
agreements enforceable or not.365 These could be used as a guide if a
state’s legislature and governor one day agree to explicitly make surrogacy contracts enforceable. There is no reason that legislation ensuring
equal protection for the rights of children of assisted reproduction,
same-sex couples, unmarried couples, and women could not be enacted
in the meantime.
L. CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER LAWS
Care should be taken to ensure that reforms of a state’s assisted
reproduction statutes do not create conflicts with other statutes.
1. Probate Code
The probate codes of some states contain, among other things,
detailed provisions concerning the parentage of children of assisted reproduction for purposes of inheritance rights.366 Greater use of crossreferencing could be made in this area. Rather than maintaining two sets
of ART statutes and definitions—one in a state’s parentage code or
chapter and another in a state’s probate code—they could be set out one
time in one place. The most natural place for them would be in a state’s
362
For a survey of the surrogacy laws in each state, see Morrissey, supra note 349, at 485–
514. States that have enacted surrogacy statutes vary with respect to the kinds of contracts that
are enforceable and the conditions under which they are enforceable. Id. It should also be noted
that the courts of a particular jurisdiction may have addressed the enforceability of surrogacy
agreements even if the legislature has not. Id.
363
See, e.g., S.F. 2965, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2008); S.F. 2627, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 2014); H.F. 2593, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2017) (not enacted).
364
See, e.g., Act of June 1, 2016, 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 189, art. 13 § 66 (establishing the
Minnesota Legislative Commission on Surrogacy).
365
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 103(c), Legislative Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
366
Colorado and Minnesota are examples. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-115, 15-11-120, 1511-121 (2019); MINN. STAT. §524.2-120 (2019).
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set of parentage laws. The probate code could then refer to the appropriate section of the parentage laws for the definitions of “parent-child
relationship” and other terms relating to parentage. Failing that, an effort
should be made to ensure that the definitions provided in each set of
laws are consistent.
2. Putative Fathers Registry
Registration with a state’s fathers adoption registry is a means
by which a putative father may be assured of receiving notice and an
opportunity to oppose any proposed adoption of a child as to whom his
possible parentage has not yet been established so that he can protect his
rights.367 An effort should be made to ensure that the provisions of the
applicable fathers adoption registry statute are consistent with any
changes that are made to assisted reproduction statutes.
3. Adoption laws
Statutes in some states require adoption records to be retained
permanently.368 This requirement is important to adoptees. Without it,
an adoptee’s right to acquire information about his or her birth parents
upon attaining the age of majority would be of little value.369 Statutes
governing assisted reproduction should provide for the permanent retention of records pertaining to children of assisted reproduction as well.
There is no reasonable justification for granting greater rights to adopted
children than to children of assisted reproduction.370 All provisions of
the Parentage Act (both current and proposed) should be reviewed to
ensure consistent treatment of children whether they are adopted or conceived via assisted reproduction with the use of a third-party donor.

367

A.S.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 688 N.E.2d 1215, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
For an example of a state putative fathers registry statute, see MINN. STAT. § 259.52, subd. 1
(2019).
368
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 259.79, subd. 3 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (2019); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-102(d) (2017).
369
Many states allow adoptees access to medical and other nonidentifying information about
their birth parents upon attaining adulthood. Lauren Fair, Shame on Us: The Need for Uniform
Open Adoption Records Legislation in the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 1041
(2008).
370
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1015–18 (1986) (comparing the rights of adopted
children to information about their biological parents with those of children of assisted reproduction).
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4. Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act371 (ICWA) is a federal enactment
establishing standards for the custody and placement of children who
are members of tribes or biological children of tribe members.372 Under
the Supremacy Clause, no state may enact laws that contradict or conflict with it.373
ICWA defines an “Indian child” as an unmarried person under
the age of eighteen who is either a member of a tribe or an eligible biological child of a member of a tribe.374 A “parent” is either a biological
or adoptive parent of an Indian child.375 An unwed father whose “paternity has not been acknowledged or established” is not a parent.376 In
short, ICWA requires either a biological or an adoptive relationship.377
For this reason, it is problematic when state statutes require that a man
and a child who are not related to each other biologically or through
adoption be treated as if they are, in fact, biologically related.378 ICWA
does not authorize states to define people who are not members of a
tribe and who are neither the biological nor adopted children of a member of a tribe as children of a member of a tribe.379 State laws that purport
to do so conflict with ICWA.380 Expanding nonbiological parentage of
unadopted children of assisted reproduction to include same-sex
spouses and unmarried persons who sign ART consent forms will only
intensify the conflict.
The simplest way to deal with this conflict would be to enact a
statute declaring that the state’s parentage laws must be construed consistently with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, United States Code,
title 25, sections 1901 to 1963. If this is done, then the assisted reproduction provisions of a state’s parentage laws would not conflict with
ICWA.

371

25 U.S.C. § 1901–1963 (2019).
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2019).
373
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; In re Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
374
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2019).
375
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2019).
376
Id.
377
25 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a), 1917 (2019).
378
Andrew Bainham, Arguments About Parentage, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 322, 334 (2008).
379
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), (9) (1978).
380
25 U.S.C. § 1903(5) (1978).
372
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M. DEFINITIONS
Apart from a statute defining “parent and child relationship,”381
the UPA 1973 and state statutes adopting it without revision do not have
a definitions section.382 In view of the technological developments and
changes in usage that have occurred since 1973, a definitions section
would be useful. The Task Force agreed.383
If a state has already set out some definitions in its probate code,
they should be reviewed to ensure consistency with any definitions that
are established for purposes of the state’s parentage laws. Better yet,
definitions relating to parentage could be set out fully in the Parentage
Act, with the Probate Code cross-referencing them rather than setting
out a separate set of definitions.
Definitions should comport with constitutional requirements, reflect current usage, and be sufficiently inclusive to accommodate both
existing and emerging technologies. The UPA 2017 has a definitions
section.384 It is quite comprehensive and could be used as a model.
Care also should be taken to ensure that any new definition or
changes to an existing one do not produce unintended consequences.
For example, under the UPA 2017, “[a] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction.”385 A “donor” is defined as a person
“who provides gametes for use in assisted reproduction.”386“ Assisted
reproduction” means a “method of causing pregnancy other . . . than
sexual intercourse.”387 Further, women who give birth to children of assisted reproduction are parents, not “donors.”388 These provisions sound
reasonable enough, but some undesirable consequences that the commissioners probably did not intend become evident when these and
other UPA principles discussed elsewhere in this Article are applied in
different scenarios.

381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1(14), (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
Id.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 8.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 & art. 7 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Id. § 702.
Id. § 102(9).
Id. § 102(4).
Id. §§ 102, 201.
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Sexual intercourse

If a child is conceived by sexual intercourse, the woman will be
the mother in any event. Whether the man would be the father will depend on non-ART law.389 Thus, even if a husband and wife consent to
the wife having sexual intercourse with a different man and everybody
involved intends the husband to be the father of the child, the husband
would still only be a presumed father, and then only by virtue of the
presumption of legitimacy during marriage.390 The second man might
also be a presumed father if tests evidence a genetic relationship or if he
and the woman end up living together and holding the child out as their
own.391 If the man who had sexual intercourse with the woman decides
to assert parentage of the child, then the husband would need to pursue
an adoption or an adjudication of parentage to protect his parental
rights.392 The same principles would apply if a married lesbian couple
arranges to have one of them become pregnant by means of sexual intercourse with a man.393 Policy makers will need to decide whether this
is a desirable outcome or not.
2.

Sperm donation

A woman who conceives a child using donated sperm would be
the mother in any event. The man whose sperm is used would not be a
parent.394 A man whose sperm is not used would not be a parent unless
he consents to the insemination with the intent to be a parent, he lives
with and holds the child out as his own, or an applicable presumption is
not rebutted.395 If any person who provides gametes for assisted reproduction is a donor, and donors are not parents of children conceived by
ART, then a husband whose own sperm is used to inseminate his wife
by any method other than sexual intercourse would not be a parent of

389

The Rights of Unmarried Fathers, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (Aug. 2017).
Batya F. Smernoff, California’s Conclusive Presumption of Paternity and the Expansion
of Unwed Fathers’ Rights, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 341 (1996).
391
James J. Vedder et al., Presumptions in Paternity Cases: Who Is the Father in the Eyes of
the Law?, FAMILY ADVOCATE 5–6 (Apr. 23, 2018).
392
Lisa Luetkemeyer, et al., Paternity Law: Sperm Donors, Surrogate Mothers and Child
Custody, J. OF MO. ST. MED. ASS’N. 1, 2 (2015).
393
Brandy Zadrozny, Lesbian Couple’s Sperm Donor Sues for Parental Rights, DADDY
DILEMMA (Jan. 31, 2018, 4:10 PM).
394
See supra Part II.
395
Ashley Fetters, The Overlooked Emotions of Sperm Donation, THE ATLANTIC, 5 (July 9,
2018).
390

JAMES

2019]

ASSISTED REPRODUCTION

311

the child.396 It is not likely that the commissioners intended to require
married men to procreate only by engaging in sexual intercourse. More
likely, they simply neglected to consider the possibility that a heterosexual couple might choose to use a method other than sexual intercourse to conceive a child using the husband’s own sperm.397
3.

Egg donation

The birth mother would be a parent in any event, whether she
uses her own or somebody else’s eggs, and whether anybody signs a
consent form or not.398 A woman who donates eggs for another woman’s
use would not be a parent.399 Thus, if a female spouse donates gametes
to her female spouse, one spouse will be a parent and the other will
not.400 If she had been a male donating gametes to her female spouse,
they would both be parents.401 This result is at odds with the mandate of
Obergefell and Pavan to treat same-sex and opposite-sex married couples alike.402
As these scenarios illustrate, the definition of “donor” that appears in the UPA 2017 may need to be tweaked to accommodate situations in which a woman’s spouse or significant other wants to be a parent but the couple either cannot or chooses not to engage in sexual
intercourse to accomplish it.403 Defining a donor as a person who provides gametes for use in assisted reproduction with no intent to be a
parent would be one way to fix the problem. Another approach would
be to exclude from the definition a “person who biologically provides
for, or consents to, assisted reproduction with another person. . .with the

396

Joanna L. Grossman, Men Who Give It Away: The Potential Perils of Free and Non-Anonymous Sperm Donation, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY FROM JUSTIA, 7 (Jan. 24,
2012).
397
Global Artificial Insemination Market - Rising Prevalence of Late Parenthood to Drive
Growth, MARKETWATCH.COM (May 13, 2005).
398
Sherry F. Colb, What is a Mother? The California “Egg Donor” Case Gets It Wrong,
FINDLAW.COM (May 19, 2004).
399
Id.
400
Sperm, Egg and Embryo Donation in NY and NJ: What to Know, RUMBOLD & SEIDELMAN,
LLP 2–3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
401
Joanna L. Grossman, Men Who Give It Away: The Potential Perils of Free and Non-Anonymous Sperm Donation, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY FROM JUSTIA, 7 (Jan. 24,
2012).
402
Laura Morgan, U.S. Supreme Court Tackles Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples,
FAMILY LAW CONSULTING 1, 2 (Apr. 6, 2018).
403
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(8) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (current version at UPA
2017).
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intent to be the parent of the child born.”404 Yet another idea would be
to distinguish between an intended parent who is also the donor and a
“third-party donor.” This is the approach the Minnesota legislature has
taken in its Probate Code.405
V. CONCLUSION
In recognizing only artificial insemination as a form of assisted
reproduction, state statutes are out of date and probably unconstitutional. Limiting the benefits and protections of assisted reproduction
parentage to opposite-sex married couples discriminates against samesex couples, unmarried persons, and single women. Protecting sperm
donors but not egg donors from the risk of liability for parental responsibilities discriminates against women. State parentage statutes are overdue for an overhaul. Equipped with an understanding of the specific
changes needed and the concerns that will need to be addressed when
making them, there is no longer any reason this cannot be done.

404

Sroka, supra note 228, at 582. Pre-conception intent to be a parent, not the particular
method of fertilization used, should control the determination whether a person becomes a parent of a child conceived by ART. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); McDonald
v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); John Lawrence Hill, What Does
It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 353, 418 (1991) (“[T]he intended parents should be considered the ‘parents’ of the child
born [of assisted reproduction]”); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 302
(1990) (“Legal rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should
recognize the importance and legitimacy of individual … intentions”).
405
MINN. STAT. § 524.1-201 (2018). Applying a distinction between heterological and homological insemination is another idea, but this approach is problematic. These terms are
used to distinguish between insemination using a husband’s sperm and insemination using
sperm from a man other than a husband. See discussion supra Section IV-A. If statutes are to
apply to both unmarried and married couples, then a new term would need to be invented to
refer to an unmarried man who is both a donor and an intended parent.

